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INTRODUCTION 
Jorge Solomon-Membreno and Fatima Marlene Villanueva-
Membreno are siblings who grew up in their grandmother’s house in 
Sensuntepeque, El Salvador.1  Sensuntepeque suffers from prolific 
gang violence at the hands of MS-13, a transnational gang that 
commits ongoing acts of assault, rape, and torture.2  MS-13 is present 
in every part of El Salvador, and exercises control over innocent 
civilians with horrific acts of violence.3  During his adolescence, Jorge 
was approached by members of MS-13 in an attempt to recruit him, 
but Jorge refused.4  His sister Fatima, who was eleven years old at the 
time, endured a barrage of sexual harassment from MS-13 members, 
who at one point threatened to “get her.”5  On her way home from 
school, Fatima was seized and knocked unconscious.6  When she 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. Solomon-Membreno v. Holder, 578 F. App’x 300, 302 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 301. 
 4. Id. at 302. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
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regained consciousness, her chest was exposed, her clothes were 
ripped, and she felt an immense pain in her stomach.7  Jorge 
confronted the gang members he believed to be responsible for 
Fatima’s rape; they responded by beating Jorge until he ran to safety.8  
Jorge did not seek help because he thought the police would provide 
no assistance, as is common in El Salvador.9  Jorge and Fatima sought 
refuge from the gang at their aunt’s home in a nearby town.10  After 
some time, they returned to their grandmother’s home, but confined 
themselves inside to avoid encountering the gang again.11 
Jorge fled El Salvador and entered the United States near Tecate, 
California.12 There, the Department of Homeland Security served him 
with a Notice to Appear in removal proceedings.13  Fatima stayed at 
her grandmother’s house, but shortly followed in her brother’s 
footsteps after discovering her grandmother’s home had been set on 
fire.14  Fatima entered the United States near Hidalgo, Texas, and was 
also served with a Notice to Appear in removal proceedings.15  Jorge 
and Fatima applied for asylum to avoid being deported back to El 
Salvador, where they were sure MS-13 awaited their arrival.16  After 
lengthy legal proceedings and a denial of their application, Jorge and 
Fatima appealed their case to the Fourth Circuit.17  The Fourth 
Circuit affirmed the denial of their asylum application, concluding 
that Jorge and Fatima did not constitute “refugees” under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) because they did not satisfy 
the Act’s definition of “a refugee.”18 
Section 1158(b)(1)(A) of the INA, which is the statute governing 
asylum claims, requires that an applicant establish that he or she is a 
refugee in order to obtain asylum in the United States.19  In order to 
establish refugee status, an applicant must show that he or she is 
persecuted because of his or her race, national origin, political 
opinion, or membership in a particular social group with defined 
                                                                                                                                         
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 303. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 303–04. 
 18. See id. at 306. 
 19. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
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boundaries.20  Fatima and Jorge sought to establish refugee status by 
asserting that they were being persecuted by gang members on 
account of their membership in a particular social group.21  The 
Fourth Circuit denied their application because their proposed group 
lacked boundaries.22  Without asylum, Fatima and Jorge would have 
to return to the very nightmare they sought to escape. 
Jorge’s and Fatima’s experience with gangs in El Salvador and in 
the United States court system is not unique.23  Their story is a prime 
example of the very issue circuit courts are confronted with by the 
recent influx of immigrants from Honduras, El Salvador, and 
Guatemala.24  Many Circuits have attempted to resolve the issue of 
whether the “membership in a particular social group” category of 
“refugee” includes children who flee gang violence in inner cities.25  
Courts of Appeals have reached different conclusions about whether 
the provision covers situations like those faced by Jorge and Fatima.26  
This division has led to a lack of uniformity in the application of 
Section 1158(b)(1)(A), and individuals with almost identical cases can 
receive contradictory judgments.27 
Part I of this Note discusses the history of gang violence and 
government corruption in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala.  
Additionally, Part I explains the basic asylum process under Section 
1158(b)(1)(A), which every individual must navigate to be granted 
asylum.  Part II of this Note examines the requirements the Board of 
                                                                                                                                         
 20. Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). 
 21. Jorge claimed that he belonged to a “social group of young Salvadoran 
students who expressly oppose gang practices and values and wish to protect their 
family against such practices.” Solomon-Membreno, 578 F. App’x at 301.  Fatima 
argued that she belonged to a “social group composed of young female students who 
are related to an individual who opposes gang practices and values.” Id. 
 22. Id. at 306. 
 23. See generally Benjamin Mueller, To Help Unaccompanied Minors, New York 
City Posts Representatives at Immigration Court, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/17/nyregion/to-help-unaccompanied-minors-city-
posts-representatives-at-immigration-court.html. 
 24. See Haeyoun Park, Children at the Border, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/07/15/us/questions-about-the-border-
kids.html. 
 25. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 26. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 27. Mejia-Fuentes v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 463 F. App’x 76, 80–81 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(granting the asylum-seeker’s petition for review and remanding to the BIA); Rivera-
Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641, 650 (10th Cir. 2012) (finding the asylum-seeker’s 
claim met two of the three requirements, but ultimately affirming the BIA’s 
decision); Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2010) (denying the 
petition for review because the asylum-seeker’s claim only met one of the three 
requirements). 
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Immigration Appeals (BIA) has promulgated for defining a particular 
social group and the differing tests that circuit courts have used to 
determine if an individual meets those requirements.  The BIA 
scrutinizes every purported particular social group with a three-part 
test,28 but circuit courts have not unanimously accepted this test.29  In 
addition, Part II explores the BIA and circuit court jurisprudence 
with respect to proposed particular social groups in the context of 
Central American gangs.  Although most circuits have denied asylum 
to children fleeing gang violence in Central American cities, there are 
two circuits that have yet to take on the issue, and another circuit that 
stands with only one foot in the door of acceptance.30 
Part III of this Note adopts the BIA’s three-part test to analyze 
asylum applications of individuals seeking to establish a particular 
social group.  Since the BIA has the authority to oversee the 
adjudication of asylum applications and the BIA has properly 
explained its reasoning for the three-part test, its standard deserves 
deference.  However, this Note disagrees with the BIA with respect to 
whether children fleeing gang violence are entitled to asylum, by 
concluding that individuals between the ages of eleven and eighteen, 
who escape gang-forced recruitment, are deserving of asylum.31 
I.  THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND 
IN THE U.S. ASYLUM PROCESS 
A. The Government Corruption and Plague of Gang Violence in 
the Inner Cities of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala 
Horrific violence committed by growing gangs, such as MS-13, 
plagues El Salvador.32  Gangs, whose membership numbers are more 
than 85,000, participate in kidnapping, extortion, and forced 
                                                                                                                                         
 28. See infra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1; see also In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 392 
(B.I.A. 2014). 
 29. See discussion infra Part II.A.4. 
 30. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 31. This Note will put special emphasis on male children who suffer from forced 
recruitment.  Because of the unique issues raised with females who are subjected to 
sexual violence, the topic of female children fleeing sexual-related forced recruitment 
is outside of the scope of this Note.  However, this Note will attempt to analogize 
females and males for the general purpose of forced recruitment, but the issue of 
sexual violence in asylum law will be avoided. 
 32. This Note discusses the effect gangs have on El Salvador, Honduras, and 
Guatemala, but will reference MS-13 in particular because it is the good example of 
gang activity in those countries. 
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recruitment.33  These groups in general, and MS-13 in particular, rely 
on forced recruitment to expand their memberships.34  Male children 
often attempt to leave El Salvador because of a fear of assault or 
death for refusing to join gangs.35  Additionally, gangs threaten to kill 
the families of the young boys they try to recruit,36 and female 
children fear rape or kidnappings at the hands of gang members.37 
El Salvador’s citizens are at the whim of these gang activities 
because the judicial system and executive branch do not provide 
much assistance.38  Unfortunately, this has led El Salvador to be 
ranked first in the world for femicide (female homicide) and lethal 
                                                                                                                                         
 33. WILLIAM A. KANDEL ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43628, 
UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN: POTENTIAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO 
RECENT IMMIGRATION 8 (2014), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/
R43628.pdf. 
 34. DIV. OF INT’L PROT., UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES 
(UNHCR), GUIDANCE NOTE ON REFUGEE CLAIMS RELATING TO VICTIMS OF 
ORGANIZED GANGS 2 (2010) [hereinafter UNHCR], available 
at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4bb21fa02.html. 
 35. WASH. OFFICE ON LATIN AM., CENTRAL AMERICAN GANG-RELATED 
ASYLUM: A RESOURCE GUIDE 3 (2008), available at http://www.wola.org/sites/
default/files/downloadable/Central%20America/past/CA%20Gang-
Related%20Asylum.pdf. 
 36. See, e.g., Michael Vincent, Gang Violence in Central America Drives Victims 
to Make Risky Cross-Border Journey to New Life in US,  ABC NEWS (Oct. 23, 2014), 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-10-24/gang-violence-central-americans-cross-usa-
border/5815552.  In an interview, a concerned mother explains that she and her 
family fled their country because boys are threatened with death or harm to their 
families if they refuse to join. See id. 
 37. WASH. OFFICE ON LATIN AM., supra note 35, at 3.  Rape victims do not report 
the crime because of a fear of reprisal, ineffective and unsupportive responses from 
authorities, and the public perception of the unlikely chance of conviction. BUREAU 
OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, EL SALVADOR 
2013 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 15 (2014), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/220654.pdf.  The fact that in 2013 there were 4826 sexual assault claims, 
but only 392 convictions supports the public’s perception of the unlikelihood of 
sexual assault convictions. Id. at 15 (noting that rape laws are, in fact, ineffectively 
enforced). 
 38. Substantial corruption in the judicial system, which undermines the rule of law 
and deteriorates the public’s respect for the judiciary, led to a criminal conviction rate 
of less than five percent. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 37, at 7 (citing the role that gangs play in the promotion 
of impunity through their use of intimidation).  Furthermore, the uncontested threats 
to, and killings of, police officers, witnesses, and victims, has led to a large 
impediment of criminal investigations. Id.  After explaining the beating he received 
for refusing to join a gang, an unnamed immigrant child recognizes the dire situation 
in an interview by stating, “[t]he gangs have practically taken control of my country.  
You don’t feel free there, it’s too dangerous.” Mila Koumpilova, Unaccompanied 
Children’s Cases Put Immigration System to the Test, STAR TRIBUNE, Oct. 16, 2014, 
http://www.startribune.com/local/279515212.html. 
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violence in 2011.39  The Salvadoran government’s tolerance of 
violence against women has specifically contributed to the leading 
femicide rate.40  Gangs take advantage of the government’s apathy 
toward women and target them for prostitution and sex trafficking if 
they refuse to join the gang.41  These gangs, however, often do not 
stop with physical harm and sexual assault, but choose to follow 
through with death threats.42  In a nation crippled by violence and a 
judicial system that refuses to help, children are taking the risk of 
fleeing El Salvador by themselves, rather than staying at home.43 
Likewise, Honduras suffers from severe violence at the hands of 
transnational gangs, who commit acts of murder, extortion, and 
kidnapping.44  Honduras also maintains an atmosphere of corruption, 
intimidation, and weakness in its justice system, which is 
underfunded, poorly staffed, and highly ineffective.45  Even the 
Honduran legislature has taken part in the corruption by suspending 
the attorney general and removing four magistrates from the 
Constitutional Chambers of the Supreme Court, contrary to its 
Constitution.46  Criminal prosecutions in Honduras are crippled by a 
lack of witness protection, poor evidence brought by the prosecution, 
and widespread distrust of the legal system.47  For women, the 
problem is particularly serious because violence against women 
continuously rises, and perpetrators too often are not convicted.48  
                                                                                                                                         
 39. GENEVA DECLARATION ON ARMED VIOLENCE & DEV., When the Victim Is a 
Woman, in GLOBAL BURDEN OF ARMED VIOLENCE 113, 119 (2011), available at 
http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/GBAV2/GBAV2011_CH4.pdf. 
 40. Id. at 122. 
 41. UNHCR, supra note 34, at 4 (recognizing that gangs target “young women 
and adolescent girls” for “prostitution and trafficking purposes, or to become sexual 
property of gangs”). 
 42. Id. at 3. 
 43. Ana Gonzalez-Barrera et al., DHS: Violence, Poverty, is Driving Children to 
Flee Central America to U.S., PEW RES. CENTER (July 1, 2014), http://www.pew
research.org/fact-tank/2014/07/01/dhs-violence-poverty-is-driving-children-to-flee-
central-america-to-u-s/. 
 44. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
HONDURAS 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 1 (2013), available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/220663.pdf. 
 45. Id. at 8.  The Department of State explicitly pointed to the lack of internal 
controls as a reason for rendering the judicial system susceptible to bribery. Id. 
 46. Id. at 8-9.  In appointing a new attorney general, the Honduran legislation did 
not abide by the constitutional process, which required certain selection procedures 
by the nominating committee. Id. at 9. 
 47. Id. (pointing to judicial corruption as another factor). 
 48. From the year 2005 to 2012, there has been a 246% increase in violent deaths 
of women. Id. at 17.  Rape, in particular, permeates throughout its society, and is 
largely underreported due to a fear of retribution and continued violence. Id.  Even 
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The excessive level of violence and the breakdown in the judicial 
system has given Honduras the top ranking for murder rate in the 
world in 2012.49  The statistics become even more sobering when 
taking into account the fact that last year 1013 people under the age 
of twenty-three were murdered in Honduras, a nation of only eight 
million people.50  These soaring murder rates are a major motivator 
for the children leaving Honduras.51 
Guatemala, too, is crippled by corruption of its police officers and 
judicial officials.52  The violence Guatemalan citizens endure comes 
from gangs and organized crimes, which is hard to measure given the 
corrupt and inadequate judicial system.53  The Guatemalan police 
force itself contributes to the high levels of crime, and police impunity 
is rampant.54  One of the many failures of the judicial system is the 
                                                                                                                                         
when the cases were reported, women have not been protected. Id.  Between 2008 
and 2010, 1010 cases of femicide were heard in court, yet only fifty-six sentences were 
handed out. GENEVA DECLARATION ON ARMED VIOLENCE & DEV., supra note 39, at 
122. 
 49. Gonzalez-Barrera et al., supra note 43.  To put this into perspective, in 2012 
Honduras had a murder rate of 90.4 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, and in the 
same year the United States had a murder rate of 4.7 homicides per 100,000 
inhabitants. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, GLOBAL STUDY ON 
HOMICIDE 2013, at 128 (2014), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/gsh/pdfs/
2014_GLOBAL_HOMICIDE_BOOK_web.pdf.  Sadly, in 2013 the homicide rate in 
Honduras’s industrialized city of San Pedro Sula stood at 187 homicides per 100,000 
inhabitants. Gonzalez-Barrera et al., supra note 43.  San Pedro Sula’s gang violence 
problem has earned it the title of murder capital of the world. Id. 
 50. Frances Robles, Fleeing Gangs, Children Head to U.S. Border, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 9, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/10/world/americas/fleeing-gangs-
children-head-to-us-border.html?_r=0.  In her article, Robles describes a late-night 
visit to a San Pedro Sula morgue where sixty bodies, all victims of violence, were 
piled in a heap, and the technicians explained that they regularly receive corpses of 
children under ten, and sometimes as young as two. Id.  She goes on to tell the story 
of an eleven-year old boy whose throat was slit for not paying a fifty-cent extortion 
fee. Id. 
 51. See generally id.  Honduran cities make up more than half of the top fifty 
Central American cities of origin for immigrant children here in the United States. 
Id.  However, almost no children come from Nicaragua, a neighboring country that 
suffers from extreme poverty, but does not share Honduras’s gang problem. Id. 
 52. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
GUATEMALA 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 1 (2014), available at  http://www.state.
gov/documents/organization/220657.pdf. 
 53. Id. at 1; HAL BRANDS, CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND THE CRISIS IN GUATEMALA: A 
CASE STUDY IN THE EROSION OF THE STATE 29 (2010), available at http://
www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB986.pdf (“[A]ll serious observers 
agree that criminal elements have been hugely successful in penetrating the security 
forces, judicial institutions, and practically every other office or agency charged with 
maintaining law and order.”). 
 54. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
supra note 52, at 5.  There were reports of police officers subjecting Guatemalan 
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lack of safety for those involved in the prosecutions.55  Women who 
suffer from rape are helpless in seeking the prosecution of their 
assailants.56  Sexual predators know this and perpetuate a level of 
sexual violence that brings Guatemala’s femicide rate to extremely 
high levels.57  The deterioration of Guatemala’s law enforcement has 
given the gang population the opportunity to grow to roughly the 
same size as the Guatemalan army.58 
Gangs in both Guatemala and Central America as a whole target 
children for forced recruitment because of the horrible economic 
conditions.59  Youths who are poor, homeless, or from marginalized 
segments of society are of particular interest to gangs because they 
are more vulnerable to forced recruitment, violence, and other 
pressures.60  The tactics used by gangs include threats of serious 
physical harm or death if they refuse to join the gang, threats to harm 
the victim’s family, and threats of rape to female members of the 
resistor’s family.61  Even when children are not targeted for 
recruitment, they are nevertheless targets for violence.  They are 
                                                                                                                                         
citizens to stops and proceeding to rape and steal from them (those police officers 
were not convicted). Id. at 6; see also BRANDS, supra note 53, at 35 (stating that only 
twenty-five percent of the population believe the police can be trusted and that 
seventy-three percent of urban and suburban residents believe the police are directly 
involved in crimes). 
 55. Judges, witnesses, and prosecutors are the recipients of threats and aggression.  
The United States Department of State stated that Guatemala’s judicial system has 
failed due to inefficiency, insufficient personnel, and corruption. BUREAU OF 
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 52, at 7. 
 56. The government does not effectively enforce its rape law. BUREAU OF 
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 52, at 15 
(citing the minimal training and capacity of the police to deal with rape).  Through 
September 2013, there were 2156 reported cases of sexual or physical assault against 
women, yet only 141 of those led to convictions. Id.  Femicide, which involves killings 
and sexual assault against women and children, had only a one percent to two percent 
conviction rate. Id. at 16. 
 57. GENEVA DECLARATION ON ARMED VIOLENCE & DEV., supra note 39, at 120.  
The sexual violence endured by women in Guatemala is related to organized crime 
and narco-trafficking. Id. at 114.  Guatemala has a femicide rate of over 10 per 
100,000 females in the population, which is five times greater than that of Western, 
Southern, and Northern European countries. Id. at 119–20. 
 58. BRANDS, supra note 53, at 23–24. 
 59. UNHCR, supra note 34, at 4 (recognizing that gangs respond with violence 
when met with rejection); see also BRANDS, supra note 53, at 25 (noting the various 
ways that gang involvement may be alluring to marginalized children); MICHAEL 
BOULTON, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, LIVING IN A WORLD OF 
VIOLENCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GANG PHENOMENON 13 (2011) (stating that 
forced recruitment only affects significant numbers of children in Central America). 
 60. UNHCR, supra note 34, at 2, 4. 
 61. BOULTON, supra note 59, at 16. 
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often the victims of gang violence as a form of subjecting their family 
members to the gang’s demands.62  For these reasons, Guatemalan 
children also flee their home country and make perilous trips to 
foreign countries.63 
B. The U.S. Asylum Process 
The asylum process can be onerous and complex for any person 
seeking protection from the horrors back home.  An individual 
seeking asylum in the United States may do so either through an 
affirmative asylum process or a defensive asylum process.64  The 
affirmative asylum process requires that an asylum-seeker be in the 
United States and actively apply for asylum.65  To begin the 
affirmative asylum process, an individual must apply for asylum with 
the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 
within one year of his or her last arrival in the United States.66  The 
individual will then receive an Appointment Notice to visit the 
nearest Application Support Center, where the individual will be 
fingerprinted and will receive background and security checks.67  The 
asylum-seeker then receives notice of a scheduled interview with an 
asylum officer.68  At the interview, an asylum-seeker is responsible for 
obtaining attorney representation, and if the individual does not 
speak English, he or she must obtain an interpreter.69  The interview 
generally lasts an hour, where the merits of the asylum-seeker’s 
application are scrutinized.70 
The asylum officer makes his or her determination about the 
asylum-seeker’s application based on meeting certain requirements.71  
The asylum-seeker must establish that he or she is eligible for asylum 
according to the INA, meets the definition of a refugee under Section 
                                                                                                                                         
 62. See BRANDS, supra note 53, at 27–28 (quoting an interview with an MS-13 
gang member, who admits to kidnapping a mother and child, dismembering them, 
and sending their body parts to the father in order to get him to pay the gang). 
 63. Why Are so Many Children Trying to Cross the US Border?, BBC NEWS 
(Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-28203923. 
 64. The Affirmative Asylum Process, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, 
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/affirmative-asylum-
process (last updated Feb. 4, 2015). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id.    
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101(a)(42)(A), and is not barred by Section 208(b)(2) of the INA.72  
The asylum officer makes the decision after the interview, and the 
individual must return another day to hear the decision.73  If the 
application is approved, the applicant is permitted to remain in the 
United States, and he or she may apply for lawful permanent 
residency and, ultimately, citizenship.74 
Unfortunately, it is almost always the case that asylum applications 
from individuals fleeing Central America are not granted.75  When the 
application is denied, the USCIS places the individual in removal 
proceedings and refers the application to an Executive Office for 
Immigration Review (EOIR) immigration court for a hearing, where 
an immigration judge reviews the claim de novo.76  At this point, the 
defensive asylum process begins.77 
The defensive asylum process can be used by aliens who are in 
removal proceedings for one of two reasons: either their application 
was denied by an asylum officer and they were referred to an 
immigration court by the USCIS, or they were arrested by the 
Department of Homeland Security at the United States-Mexico 
border or within the Unites States.78  At a defensive asylum hearing in 
                                                                                                                                         
 72. Id.  Section 101(a)(42)(A) will be discussed further below.  Section 208(b)(2) 
covers exceptions to granting asylum based on an individual’s past criminal activity.  
INA § 208(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2) (2012).  This Note seeks to argue in favor of 
granting asylum for children who are fleeing gang violence and criminal activity 
rather than argue in favor of granting asylum for children who have committed such 
acts, and therefore Section 208(b)(2) is negligible for purposes of this Note. 
 73. Affirmative Asylum Process, supra 64.   Importantly, asylum does not 
guarantee permanent residence in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(2) (2012).  
There are a variety of reasons for asylum to be terminated, including a change in 
circumstances in his or her country of origin. Id. § 1158(c)(2)(A). 
 74. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FACT 
SHEET: ASYLUM AND WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL RELIEF, CONVENTION AGAINST 
TORTURE PROTECTIONS (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/09/
AsylumWithholdingCATProtections.pdf. 
 75. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, OFFICE 
OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS, AND TECHNOLOGY, ASYLUM STATISTICS FY 2009–2013, at 
31–32 (2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/efoia/FY2009-FY2013Asylum
StatisticsbyNationality.pdf.  In 2013, the Executive Office for Immigration Review 
received a total of 9898 asylum applications from individuals who had fled 
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Id.  Of the 9898 applications, the Executive 
Office for Immigration Review granted only 426, or 4.3%. See id. 
 76. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, supra 
note 74, at 3. 
 77. Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., 
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-united-
states (last viewed May 15, 2015). 
 78. Id.  Though there are many ways to enter the United States, migrants from 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras enter the United States through the Mexican 
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the immigration court, immigration judges hear asylum cases in an 
adversarial fashion.79  The applicant (and, if represented, his or her 
attorney), argues against the United States, which is represented by 
an attorney from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).80  
The immigration judge then determines whether the applicant is 
eligible for asylum, and, if so, grants asylum.81  If, however, the 
immigration judge denies the applicant’s request, the immigration 
judge will inquire as to whether any other forms of relief from 
removal are available to the applicant.82  If none are available, the 
immigration judge will order that the alien be removed from the 
United States.83  The applicant is subsequently removed from the 
United States within ninety days of when the removal order becomes 
administratively final.84  The applicant will be deported to the country 
where the individual boarded the vessel or aircraft to come to the 
United States.85  Both parties (the United States and the applicant) 
may appeal the immigration judge’s decision to the BIA.86  If the 
asylum-seeker contests the BIA’s determination, he or she may 
appeal to the federal circuit court of appeals that has jurisdiction over 
the claim.87 
The disagreement between the United States and an asylum-seeker 
in the defensive asylum process is whether the applicant is eligible for 
asylum based on the facts presented at the interview with the asylum 
officer.88  An applicant must establish that he or she satisfies the 
definition of a refugee to be eligible for asylum.89  Only aliens who are 
physically present in the United States may apply for asylum.90  To be 
granted asylum, an applicant bears the burden of establishing that he 
                                                                                                                                         
border and endure an extremely perilous journey. Paulina Villegas & Randal C. 
Archibold, Mexico Makes Route Tougher for Migrants, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/world/americas/mexico-makes-route-tougher-for-
migrants.html?_r=0. 
 79. See The Affirmative Asylum Process, supra note 64. 
 80. See id. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See id. 
 84. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)–(B)(i) (2012). 
 85. Id. § 1231(b)(1)(A). 
 86. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, supra note 
74, at 4. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See The Affirmative Asylum Process, supra note 64. 
 89. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
 90. Id. § 1158(a)(1). 
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or she is a refugee.91  As highlighted above, to establish refugee status 
an applicant must show that he or she is outside the country of his or 
her nationality, and that he or she “is unable or unwilling to return to, 
and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection 
of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.”92 
In essence, according to Section 1101(a)(42), an asylum-seeker 
must prove three elements to establish refugee status: (1) that the 
alien has suffered past persecution or maintains a well-founded fear 
of persecution; (2) that one of the five enumerated categories93 is a 
central reason for the persecution; and (3) that the persecution is 
perpetuated by an organization that the government is unable or 
unwilling to control.94  The second element is a particularly 
controversial area in asylum law, where the circuit courts have 
disagreed on whether children fleeing from gangs in Central America 
satisfies one of the five enumerated categories (namely, membership 
in a particular group).95  The BIA created a test to determine whether 
individuals should be granted asylum, which has evolved over the 
years but has not been uniformly accepted.96 
                                                                                                                                         
 91. Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).  There are many exceptions in the INA for obtaining 
asylum. See id. § 1158(b)(2)(A).  However, this Note will not discuss these 
exceptions, as they do not pertain to the issue this Note attempts to resolve. 
 92. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012).  There are other ways to establish refugee 
status.  However, this Note will not discuss them because they do not pertain to the 
issue at hand.  Additionally, the requirement that the alien prove that he or she is 
outside his or her country will always be established for asylum purposes because 
asylum may only be granted when the alien is physically in the United States. See 8 
U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1).  Therefore, an important distinction is that an alien may be a 
refugee without having the protection of asylum because refugee status requires only 
being outside of his or her country of nationality. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). 
 93. The five enumerated categories are race, religion, nationality, membership in 
a particular social group, or political opinion. Id. § 1101(a)(42). 
 94. Y.V.Z. v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 492 F. App’x 291, 292–93 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 95. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 96. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
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II.  CONFLICTING VIEWS ON THE PROPER ASYLUM TEST 
A. The Evolution of the Definition of “Membership in a 
Particular Social Group” 
1. The Board of Immigration Appeals Takes the First Step: Acosta 
To reiterate, an asylum-seeker must establish that he or she 
suffered past persecution or has a well-founded fear of future 
persecution on account of any one of the five enumerated categories 
in order to be granted asylum.97  This Note will focus on the category 
of “membership in a particular group.”98  The BIA uses a three-step 
analysis when reviewing applications for asylum based on 
“membership in a particular group.”  The first requirement was 
created in the seminal case In re Acosta.99  In In re Acosta, the 
respondent, a thirty-six-year-old man from El Salvador, entered the 
United States without inspection and stood to be removed.100  The 
respondent applied for asylum, but the immigration judge denied his 
application.101  On appeal, the BIA considered his application for 
asylum, and, in doing so, articulated the first requirement for asylum 
applicants seeking to establish refugee status under the INA via 
“membership in a particular social group.”102 
Before relocating to the United States, the respondent in In re 
Acosta formed a taxi company with fellow drivers to be operated in 
San Salvador, El Salvador.103  The founders, including the respondent, 
managed the company and continued to drive their taxis.104  The taxi 
company began to receive anonymous phone calls and notes believed 
to be from anti-government guerillas requesting that the taxi 
company cease its services.105 After refusing to comply with the 
requests, the individuals working for the taxi company began to 
receive threats of retaliation, which were later carried out.106  
                                                                                                                                         
 97. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 229–30 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 98. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).  Membership in a particular group has generated much 
jurisprudence and inconsistency given the variety of definitions purported by asylum-
seekers. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 231. 
 99. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 211 (B.I.A. 1985) (overruled in part by In re 
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 439 (B.I.A. 1987)). 
 100. Id. at 213. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 216. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
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Eventually, the respondent began to receive threats at his home, and 
was later attacked in his taxicab.107  After the attack, the respondent 
fled El Salvador because he feared for his life and traveled to the 
United States, where he applied for asylum.108 
The BIA evaluated the validity of the respondent’s claim of 
“membership in a particular social group,” which he framed as taxi 
drivers from the respondent’s company and persons engaged in the 
transportation industry of El Salvador.109  Given the sparse evidence 
of congressional intent as to the meaning of “membership in a 
particular social group,” the BIA used its tools of statutory 
construction.110  The BIA applied the doctrine of ejusdem generis and 
determined that the other four categories described persecution 
aimed at an immutable characteristic.111  The BIA defined an 
“immutable characteristic” as “a characteristic that either is beyond 
the power of an individual to change or is so fundamental to 
individual identity or conscience that it ought not be required to be 
changed.”112  Thus, persecution on account of membership in a 
particular social group requires a showing of persecution directed 
toward an individual whom is a member of a group that shares a 
common, immutable characteristic.113   The BIA explained: 
The shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, 
or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared past 
experience such as former military leadership or land ownership.  
The particular kind of group characteristic that will qualify under 
this construction remains to be determined on a case-by-case basis.  
However, whatever the common characteristic that defines the 
group, it must be one that the members of the group either cannot 
change, or should not be required to change because it is 
fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.114 
Applying this newly established definition for a particular social 
group, the BIA found that the respondent did not belong to a 
particular social group because taxi drivers could change professions, 
and therefore the purported group did not possess an immutable 
                                                                                                                                         
 107. Id. at 217. 
 108. Id. at 213. 
 109. Id. at 232.  COTAXI is the name of the taxi company that the respondent co-
founded.  Id. at 216. 
 110. Id. at 232–33. 
 111. Id. at 233. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
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characteristic.115  The common, immutable characteristic requirement 
would henceforth be applied to every particular social group that was 
proposed at asylum hearings because of the BIA’s precedential 
authority.116  Eventually, this requirement would be examined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States and become established as a 
bedrock principle in asylum law.117 
2. The Supreme Court Defers to the BIA 
In INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre,118 the Supreme Court of the United 
States explicitly held that the BIA should be given the appropriate 
deference in its interpretation of the INA.119  The respondent in 
Aguirre-Aguirre was a Guatemalan native who had participated in 
various crimes in his home country.120  The BIA interpreted the INA 
and determined that the respondent was removable because the INA 
barred him from the relief he sought.121  The respondent appealed to 
the Ninth Circuit, and the circuit court determined that the BIA had 
incorrectly interpreted the INA.122  The Supreme Court then granted 
certiorari to determine whether the Ninth Circuit correctly 
interpreted the INA and took this opportunity to solidify the level of 
deference attributed to the BIA when interpreting the INA.123 
The Supreme Court began its analysis in Aguirre-Aguirre by 
plainly stating that the BIA was entitled to Chevron deference124 
                                                                                                                                         
 115. Id. at 234. 
 116. See Precedent Decisions, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., 
http://www.uscis.gov/laws/precedent-decisions (last updated Sept. 10, 2013). 
 117. See discussion infra Part II.A.2. 
 118. 526 U.S. 415 (1999). 
 119. Id. at 424–25 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837 (1984)).  The applicant in this case was seeking to withhold the removal 
proceedings, which is similar to seeking asylum, albeit a more difficult burden of 
proof.  However, the case stands for a broader, and more relevant, proposition, 
namely that the BIA is entitled to deference for its interpretation of the INA’s 
provisions. Id. at 425. 
 120. Id. at 418.  Specifically, the petitioner set fires to buses, assaulted passengers, 
and vandalized shops. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 424. 
 124. Chevron deference dictates that whenever a court reviews an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute, the court must answer two questions. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 
842.  The court must first determine whether Congress has spoken on the precise 
issue at hand. Id.  If Congress has clearly stated its intent, the court and agency must 
give effect to that intent. Id. at 842–43.  If Congress has not spoken on the precise 
issue, the court may not put forth its own interpretation of the statute but rather must 
proceed to the next question. Id.  Next, the court must determine if the agency’s 
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because the Ninth Circuit was confronted with issues that implicated 
the BIA’s construction of the INA.125  The Court pointed to explicit 
language in the INA, which charged the Attorney General with the 
administration and enforcement of the Act.126  It then explained that 
Section 1253(h) of the INA granted decision-making authority to the 
Attorney General.127  Lastly, the Court noted that the Attorney 
General had vested the BIA with “the discretion and authority 
conferred upon the Attorney General by law” in “considering and 
determining cases before it.”128  Aguirre-Aguirre set the path for 
circuit courts to defer to the BIA’s determination, and, subsequently, 
the BIA has been cited approvingly by the circuit courts for its 
decision in In re Acosta.129 
The Supreme Court has not given its own interpretation of Section 
1158; rather, the Court stated that the provision should gain its 
meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication.130  Thus, 
circuit courts apply the BIA’s standards to every asylum application 
in their individual discretion, which consequently promotes confusion 
and inconsistency in the application of Section 1158.131  A main force 
behind this inconsistency is the fact that circuit courts review the issue 
of whether an applicant is a member of a particular social group 
under the INA de novo, while giving Chevron deference to the BIA’s 
interpretation of the statute.132  Specifically, the circuit courts have 
departed from the BIA’s last two prongs in its three-step test.133 
                                                                                                                                         
interpretation is a permissible construction of the statute. Id. at 843.  Essentially, the 
court will be prohibited from substituting its own construction of a statute so long as 
the agency has made a reasonable interpretation. Id. at 844. 
 125. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424. 
 126. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (1994)). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 425 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1) (1998)). 
 129. See, e.g., Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1196, 1198–99 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(deferring to the BIA’s interpretation of membership in a particular social group in 
Acosta and citing to Aguirre-Aguirre); Silva v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(giving Chevron deference according to Aguirre-Aguirre, and applying the BIA’s 
definition of membership in a particular social group in Acosta). 
 130. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987). 
 131. See Cruz-Funez v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1187, 1191 (10th Cir. 2005) (“The courts 
are struggling to set the parameters for the definition of a ‘particular social group’ in 
light of Acosta.  The circuit courts are not in agreement on a test.”). 
 132. See, e.g., Chavez v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 571 F. App’x 861, 863–64 (11th Cir. 
2014) (holding that the BIA’s legal determinations are reviewed de novo, but are 
given Chevron deference); Karki v. Holder, 715 F.3d 792, 800 (10th Cir. 2013) 
(holding that the BIA’s decisions on purely legal questions are reviewed de novo); 
Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 668 (7th Cir. 2013) (giving Chevron deference to 
statutory interpretation, but holding that whether a group constitutes a particular 
social group is a question of law that is reviewed de novo); Castaneda-Castillo v. 
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3. The BIA’s Social Distinction and Particularity Requirements 
After In re Acosta, the BIA named two separate requirements that 
must be met in order for an asylum applicant to establish 
“membership in a particular social group”—“social distinction” and 
“particularity.”134  The first of these two requirements is “social 
distinction,” articulated in In Re C-A-.135  In Re C-A- revolved 
around the respondent, a Colombian baker, who had fled his country 
because he feared persecution by the Cali drug cartel.136  The 
respondent applied for asylum based upon his “membership in a 
particular social group,” namely, noncriminal informants who had 
informed against the cartel.137  In denying his application for asylum, 
the BIA focused on whether the purported group was socially 
distinct.138 
“Social distinction” is found when the group is recognized as such 
by others in society.139  For example, social groups based on an innate 
characteristic such as sex are recognizable social groups in society.140  
When determining whether the “social distinction” requirement is 
met, the relevant factor is the extent to which members of the 
community perceive those with the common, immutable 
                                                                                                                                         
Holder, 638 F.3d 354, 363 (1st Cir. 2011) (explaining that the ordinary remand rule 
applies to issues not yet decided by the BIA, but de novo review is appropriate to the 
BIA’s decisions on the issue of a particular social group definition because it is a 
“pure issue of law”); Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 124 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(holding that the BIA’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo and receive 
substantial, but not unlimited, deference); Ayala v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1095, 1096–97 
(9th Cir. 2011) (holding that whether a group constitutes a particular social group 
under the Immigration and Nationality Act is reviewed de novo); Valdiviezo-
Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating that 
questions of law are reviewed de novo, and the BIA’s statutory interpretations 
receive Chevron deference); Malonga v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 546, 553 (8th Cir. 2008) 
(elucidating that defining a particular social group presents a question of law, which is 
reviewed de novo, but according substantial deference to the BIA’s statutory 
interpretations). 
 133. See discussion infra Part II.A.4. 
 134. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 232 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 135. 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959–60 (B.I.A. 2006).  In Re C-A- uses the term social 
“visibility,” but the most recent BIA case on the matter renamed the term socially 
“distinct” as a way of clarifying the requirement. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 
236.  Although case law uses the old term “socially visible,” this Note will refer to the 
requirement by its new name, “social distinction,” for the same purpose the BIA 
chose to rename the term: clarity. 
 136. In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 952–53. 
 137. Id. at 953. 
 138. Id. at 959–61. 
 139. Id. at 959. 
 140. Id. 
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characteristic in question as members of a social group.141  In In Re C-
A-, the BIA held that social distinction is limited to informants who 
are discovered because they appeared as witnesses, and since the 
respondent had not participated as a witness, he was no different than 
anyone else who crosses the cartel’s path.142 
The second requirement that must be satisfied to establish 
persecution on account of membership in a particular social group is 
particularity.143  The BIA, in the landmark case In Re A-M-E- & J-G-
U-, explained that a social group must be defined with particularity so 
as not to be amorphous.144  In that case, the respondents were a 
married couple from Guatemala who came to the United States for 
economic opportunity and to be with their family.145  The couple 
applied for asylum when faced with removal proceedings, arguing 
that they would be threatened and harassed by organized political 
gangs if they were to return.146  They attempted to establish refugee 
status by demonstrating that they were members of a particular social 
group, namely, affluent Guatemalans.147  In holding that “affluent 
Guatemalans” do not satisfy the “particularity” requirement, the BIA 
clarified that this requirement is meant to avoid definitions which are 
indeterminate, thereby preventing the population of the social group 
from varying.148  Furthermore, the BIA asserted that the characteristic 
describing the social group may not be too subjective or inchoate.149  
Essentially, when determining if the proposed description is 
sufficiently particular, an individual should ask if the definition is “too 
amorphous to provide an adequate benchmark for determining group 
membership.”150  These two new requirements, “social distinction” 
and “particularity,” were added to the common, immutable 
characteristic test, and applied to asylum cases by the BIA.151  
                                                                                                                                         
 141. Id. at 957 (emphasis added). 
 142. Id. at 960. 
 143. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 144. 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 76 (B.I.A. 2007). 
 145. Id. at 70. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 73. 
 148. Id. at 76.  The BIA denied a social group based on affluent Guatemalans 
because of the possibility the group’s numbers could vary from one percent to twenty 
percent of the country’s population. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 232 (B.I.A. 2014). 
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However, circuit courts did not unanimously accept these two new 
requirements.152 
4. The Circuit Courts Disagree on the Appropriate Deference 
Level 
The evolution of the BIA’s analysis of asylum applications caused 
the circuit courts to begin to diverge from one another.153  While the 
common, immutable characteristic test remained solidified by the 
Supreme Court of the United States,154 the introduction of two new 
requirements caused some circuit courts to question the appropriate 
deference level for these new prongs.155  A majority of the circuit 
courts, however, extended deference to the entire three-step test 
using the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Aguirre-Aguirre.156 
a. The First Circuit Upholds the BIA’s Test 
In Mayorga-Vidal v. Holder,157 the First Circuit made clear that it 
would afford deference to the BIA’s requirements of “membership in 
a particular social group.”158  Mayorga–Vidal, who was approximately 
fourteen or fifteen years old, encountered MS-13 members.159  These 
gang members attempted to recruit him on multiple occasions.160  
When Mayorga-Vidal would refuse, the gang members responded 
with threats of violence.161  Five months after gang members, who 
were trying to recruit him, threatened to end his life, Mayorga-Vidal 
fled to the United States and sought asylum.162 
The social group definition in question was “young Salvadorian 
men who have resisted gang recruitment and whose parents are 
                                                                                                                                         
 152. See discussion infra Part II.A.4. 
 153. See discussion infra Part II.A.4. 
 154. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424–25 (1999) (citing Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). 
 155. See, e.g., Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 668 (7th Cir. 2013); Valdiviezo-
Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 608 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 156. See, e.g., Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 520–21 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(citing Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424). 
 157. 675 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2012).  The case was on appeal after the BIA dismissed the 
applicant’s asylum claim. Id. at 13. 
 158. Id. at 14 (“The term ‘particular social group,’ 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), is not 
defined by statute, and we accord deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the 
bounds of this phrase.”). 
 159. Id. at 12. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
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unavailable to protect them.”163  The court embraced the BIA’s three-
part test to determine the validity of the proposed social group.164  
Upon rejecting the asserted social group, the First Circuit reasoned 
that young men without familial support are not viewed as distinct 
within society.165  The court argued that the familial support 
characteristic encourages a subjective interpretation, and in doing so 
fails to comply with the BIA’s requirements.166  The imposition of 
subjective interpretation and the want of boundaries, the court 
determined, made the purported group inconsistent with the 
particularity and social distinction requirements.167  Other circuits 
have joined the First Circuit in embracing the BIA’s three-part test 
for membership in a particular social group under the INA.168 
b. The Fourth Circuit Applies the BIA’s Three-Step Test 
The Fourth Circuit, however, has reacted differently.  Notably, this 
court uses the BIA’s three-step framework.169  It does not, however, 
explicitly embrace the “social distinction” requirement; rather, it 
found no need to question the requirement’s validity under the INA 
because the asylum claims are dismissed for failure to meet the 
                                                                                                                                         
 163. Id. at 11 
 164. See id. at 14 (accepting the common, immutable characteristic, social 
distinction, and particularity requirements); see also De Carvalho-Frois v. Holder, 
667 F.3d 69, 73 (1st Cir. 2012); Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 
2010). 
 165. Mayorga-Vidal, 675 F.3d at 16.  The court elaborated on its position, and 
explained that there can be many reasons for a young man in El Salvador to be 
without familial support. Id. 
 166. Id. at 17.  Of particular concern was where a line would be drawn between 
youths that have familial protection and those who do not. Id. 
 167. Id. at 15. 
 168. See Chavez v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 571 F. App’x 861, 864 (11th Cir. 2014) 
(stating the court must defer to the BIA’s interpretation in accordance with 
Chevron); Umaña-Ramos v. Holder, 724 F.3d 667, 671 (6th Cir. 2013) (giving 
deference to the BIA’s requirements); Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 
520–21 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that the particularity and social distinction 
requirements are entitled to Chevron deference); Gaitan v. Holder, 671 F.3d 678, 681 
(8th Cir. 2012) (holding that the particularity and social distinction requirements are 
not arbitrary and capricious); Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641, 652 (10th 
Cir. 2012) (accepting the BIA’s requirements); Constanza v. Holder, 647 F.3d 749, 
753 (8th Cir. 2011) (using the BIA’s three-step test in its analysis); Bonilla-Morales v. 
Holder, 607 F.3d 1132, 1137 (6th Cir. 2010) (requiring both social distinction and 
particularity to establish membership in a particular social group); Ucelo-Gomez v. 
Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73-74 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that the BIA’s analysis was 
consistent with its precedent, and therefore entitled to Chevron deference). 
 169. Zelaya v. Holder, 668 F.3d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Scatambuli v. 
Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2009)) (stating the social distinction requirement is 
relevant).  
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particularity threshold.170  Notwithstanding its use of the social 
distinction prong, the Fourth Circuit continues to avoid explicitly 
accepting or rejecting the requirement.171  For example, in Crespin-
Valladares v. Holder, the Fourth Circuit incorporates a footnote 
where it assures the reader that the validity of the “social distinction” 
requirement is not in question, and, therefore, it would not weigh in 
on the issue.172  This tactic was repeated again in Zelaya v. Holder, 
where the court included another footnote, which reiterated that the 
court had not yet decided whether the requirement comported with 
the INA.173  Recently, the Fourth Circuit removed all doubt that it 
would not determine whether the BIA was entitled to Chevron 
deference for its “social distinction” test by explicitly declining to 
make such a decision in the text of an opinion.174 
c. The Ninth Circuit Provides Its Own Asylum Test 
The Ninth Circuit has taken a different approach than the BIA and 
its sister circuits, including the First and the Fourth.175  This court 
requires the asylum-seeker to establish “membership in a particular 
social group” on one of two grounds: (1) by putting forth a group that 
is united by a voluntary association,176 or (2) by satisfying the BIA’s 
three-pronged test.177  The Ninth Circuit places a restriction on what 
seems to be an all-inclusive, two-optioned test.  The purported group 
cannot be defined by a sweeping demographic division where its 
individual members manifest “a plethora of different lifestyles, 
varying interests, diverse cultures, and contrary political leanings.”178  
The court has held that a group is too broadly defined when it lacks a 
unifying relationship or characteristic which narrows the diverse and 
disconnected group.179  Last, the Ninth Circuit’s approach does not 
                                                                                                                                         
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 169 (Floyd, J., concurring).  
 172. Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 125 n.5 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 173. Zelaya, 668 F.3d at 165 n.4. 
 174. See Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d 902, 910 (4th Cir. 2014) (“While we have 
endorsed both the immutability and particularity criteria . . . we have explicitly 
declined to determine whether the social [distinction] criterion is a reasonable 
interpretation of the INA.”) (citing Zelaya, 668 F.3d at 165 n.4). 
 175. See generally Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000), 
overruled on other grounds by Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177, 1187 (9th Cir. 
2005), vacated, 547 U.S. 183 (2006). 
 176. This includes former associations as well. 
 177. See Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 666 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Hernandez-
Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1093. 
 178. See Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 668. 
 179. Id. 
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put a limit on how large the group may be, so long as it satisfies its 
test.180  When using the BIA’s test, the Ninth Circuit takes a broad 
view on what groups constitute a particular social group.181  For 
example, the court has held that a group defined as females of a 
particular country can satisfy the BIA’s requirements to be a 
particular social group.182 
d. The Seventh Circuit Rejects “Social Distinction” 
The Seventh Circuit has opposed the BIA’s “social distinction” 
prerequisite.183  The rejection of the “social distinction” requirement 
stems from the view that the requirement is inconsistent with prior 
BIA decisions, and does not necessarily follow from an interpretation 
of the INA.184  The Seventh Circuit cites to cases where the BIA 
makes no mention of social distinction, yet finds an asserted group to 
constitute a particular social group.185  Implicit in its holding is the 
idea that because the BIA is inconsistent with its use of the “social 
distinction” requirement, the BIA is not worthy of deference.186  This 
analysis requires obedience to the principle that a circuit court cannot 
defer to an agency when the agency has been inconsistent, because it 
may lead to arbitrariness and usurp the agency’s responsibilities.187  
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has also rejected the “social 
distinction” precondition on the ground that it is nonsensical.188  The 
                                                                                                                                         
 180. Id. at 669.  The court clarified that the size and breadth of a group cannot be 
the sole reason for denying asylum under the category of membership in a particular 
social group. See id. at 669 (emphasis added). 
 181. See Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 797 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 182. See id.  The court boldly stated that in some circumstances females in general 
may constitute a particular social group as a logical application of asylum law. See id.; 
see also Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 667.  The Ninth Circuit has also held that broad groups 
based on sexual orientation and sexual identity constitute a particular social group.  
Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Karouni v. 
Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that all alien homosexuals are 
members of a particular social group). 
 183. See Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 668 (7th Cir. 2013) (stating applicants do 
not need to show that they would be recognized as members of a social group); see 
also Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 184. See Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 615–16. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 615.  The court notes that it recognizes the Supreme Court has given 
Chevron deference to the BIA but states that with regard to the social distinction 
requirement the BIA has been inconsistent. Id. 
 187. Id. at 616 (citing AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 452 F.3d 830, 839 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Idaho 
Power Co. v. FERC, 312 F.3d 454, 461–62 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (rejecting an agency’s 
interpretation because it is inconsistent and nonsensical)). 
 188. Id. 
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court explains that “social distinction” is something that is impossible 
to detect, and in some cases, individuals will go to great lengths to 
ensure they are not socially distinct.189 
e. The Third Circuit Rejects the BIA’s Additional Requirements 
The Third Circuit, alternatively, rejects the BIA’s additional 
qualifications and argues that neither the “particularity” nor the 
“social distinction” requirement is entitled to Chevron deference.190  
With respect to the “social distinction” requirement, the Third Circuit 
criticizes the BIA for not using the requirement in any of its prior 
cases where a purported group was held to constitute a particular 
social group.191  The court has pointed out that certain characteristics 
have survived the common, immutable characteristic test, but are 
internal and cannot be known by others in society unless and until the 
individual makes the characteristic known.192  For example, a 
homosexual individual’s sexual orientation is an immutable 
characteristic, which is common among members of the homosexual 
community, but the presence of the characteristic would be unknown 
to society until a homosexual individual makes it known.193  Thus, 
under this view, since the “social distinction” requirement is 
inconsistent with prior BIA decisions, it is an unreasonable addition 
to the BIA’s test to establish refugee status vis-à-vis a particular social 
group.194  This court mimics the Seventh Circuit’s additional reason 
for rejecting the “social distinction” requirement,195 under the theory 
that to apply the social distinction prong to individuals who go 
through great lengths to avoid persecution by blending into society 
would be nonsensical.196 
                                                                                                                                         
 189. Id.  Prime examples are the cases of women who belong to tribes that practice 
female genital mutilation.  In those cases, women would undoubtedly conceal their 
opposition to those practices, and it is fair to say that they would refuse to 
acknowledge such a group’s existence or that they belong to such a group, since the 
alternative would be to paint a target on themselves. Id. at 616. 
 190. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 608 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
 191. See id. at 604. 
 192. Id. (arguing that these characteristics would not pass the social distinction 
test). 
 193. See id. 
 194. Id.; see also Y.V.Z. v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 492 Fed. App’x 291, 295–96 (3d 
Cir. 2012). 
 195. The Third Circuit spent over a full page explaining in depth why the Seventh 
Circuit rejected social distinction. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 604–06. 
 196. See id. at 607. 
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The Third Circuit, however, adds a new position to the controversy 
by rejecting the “particularity” requirement as well.197  Under the 
Third Circuit’s approach, “particularity” is nothing more than a 
rewording of the “social distinction” qualification, and thus, the 
former is rejected for the same reasons as the latter.198  Therefore, 
according to this court, the “particularity” requirement is also 
unreasonable because of the BIA’s inconsistency in applying it to 
asserted social groups.199  Ultimately, this leads to the conclusion that 
neither the “particularity” nor the “social distinction” requirement 
are entitled to Chevron deference.200  The Third Circuit has further 
opined that the BIA cannot depart from its announced rule without 
giving a principled reason.201  In doing so, the court has asserted, the 
agency acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or in an abuse of discretion.202  
Unfortunately, the trouble does not end here, as the circuit courts are 
not unanimous as to how a test, or lack thereof, applies to the many 
children fleeing their home countries because of the ubiquitous gang 
violence. 
B. Membership in a Particular Social Group in the Context of 
Central American Gangs 
1. The BIA Takes a Position on Gang Related Asylum Claims 
Two years after announcing its three-part test in In Re C-A-,203 the 
BIA had an opportunity to take a position on gang related asylum 
claims.  In In re S-E-G-,204 the BIA addressed the issue of children 
resisting gang recruitment for the first time.205  The respondent, a 
nineteen-year-old woman with two sixteen-year-old brothers, lived in 
El Salvador.206  MS-13, the dominant gang in their town, harassed, 
robbed, and beat the boys for refusing to join their gang.207  MS-13 
members then threatened to rape the female respondent if the boys 
                                                                                                                                         
 197. Id. at 608. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959–60 (B.I.A. 2006). 
 204. 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (B.I.A. 2008). 
 205. See generally id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 580.  Armed gang members also threatened the boys to join the gang or 
their bodies were to end up in a dumpster someday. Id. 
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did not join their gang.208  News of a young boy who was shot and 
killed by the gang for refusing to join the gang further inspired fear in 
the siblings.209  The respondent and her brothers never reported the 
incidents to the police for fear of retaliation and the belief that the 
police would not provide assistance.210 
In U.S. removal proceedings, the respondents sought asylum based 
upon “membership in a particular social group,” but the immigration 
judge ruled that the beatings and threats were based on the gang’s 
desire to recruit new members, rather than to punish the respondents 
for their membership in a particular social group.211  On appeal, the 
respondent attempted to convince the BIA that the siblings were in 
fact persecuted because they belonged to a particular social group, 
“Salvadoran youth who have been subjected to recruitment efforts by 
MS-13 and who have rejected or resisted membership in the gang 
based on their own personal, moral, and religious opposition to the 
gang’s values and activities.”212 
In denying the asylum application, the BIA scrutinized the 
respondents’ definition of a particular social group vigorously, using 
both the “particularity” and “social distinction” requirements, and 
found that the definition failed to satisfy those conditions.213   The 
BIA stated that the proposed definition did not satisfy the 
“particularity” requirement because the terms of the group were 
amorphous, and there was no evidence showing that gangs limited 
their efforts to male children who resist gang recruitment based on 
their personal, moral, or religious opposition to gang activity.214  
Another fatal issue for the respondents was the lack of evidence that 
gang members focused their efforts to punish individuals with the 
asserted characteristics.215  Additionally, the BIA reasoned that the 
purported social group constituted a potentially large and diffuse 
segment of society, and that the gang’s motivation for targeting and 
                                                                                                                                         
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 581. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 584–88.  Importantly, the BIA explained that claims for asylum based on 
age may be cognizable. Id. at 583–84.  The BIA argued that although youth may 
change and an individual may no longer be considered young through the passage of 
time, youth may still be considered an immutable characteristic because it is out of 
the control of any individual. Id. 
 214. Id. at 585.  The terms were considered amorphous because people’s ideas of 
their meaning may vary. Id. 
 215. Id. 
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recruiting the boys could be completely different than the fact that 
they belonged to the group.216 
In In re S-E-G-, the BIA determined that the respondents also 
failed to satisfy the “social distinction” requirement.217  The BIA held 
that Salvadoran youths who have resisted gang recruitment are not 
socially distinct because there was little evidence that the community 
perceived them as a group, or that they experienced a higher 
incidence of crime than the rest of the population.218  Since gangs are 
known to retaliate against anyone who would interfere with their 
criminal enterprise, the BIA found that male children who resist gang 
recruitment are in the same position as every other person who is a 
threat to the gang’s interest, and therefore not socially distinct.219  
Thus, the BIA held that “young Salvadorans who have been subject 
to recruitment efforts by criminal gangs, but who have refused to join 
for personal, religious, or moral reasons . . . do[] not qualify as a 
particular social group.”220 
The most recent adjudication on the topic of individuals fleeing 
Central America due to gang-forced recruitment tactics came in 2014 
in In re M-E-V-G-.221  Echoing its rationale in In re S-E-G-, the BIA 
denied the asylum application of a Honduran youth who, along with 
his family, was kidnapped and beaten by members of a gang while 
traveling. The gang then threatened to kill him if he refused to join 
them.222  After the incident, the gang threw rocks and spears at him 
and shot at him, two to three times per week.223  The BIA reasoned 
that despite certain segments of a population being more susceptible 
                                                                                                                                         
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 588. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id.  “Notably, neither the 2004 Country Reports, nor more recent reports, 
mention forced recruitment by gang members or persecution against individuals who 
resist the gang, and the respondents have not submitted evidence that persuades us 
that gangs commit violent acts for reasons other than gaining more influence and 
power, and recruiting young males to fill their ranks.” Id. at 587–88. 
 220. Id. at 588.  Shortly after In re S-E-G-, the BIA was confronted with a broad 
definition, persons resistant to gang membership, in In re E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 
591 (B.I.A. 2008), which was also rejected for not being socially distinct. See id. at 
594–95.  The BIA found that membership in a larger group of people who are 
resistant to gangs is of no concern to anyone in Honduras or the gangs. Id. at 595.  
While admitting that young, urban males in Honduras might well be suspected by 
others in the community to have been approached by gangs seeking their 
membership, and to have refused, the BIA held that a purely statistical showing is 
insufficient to establish existence of a social group. Id. 
 221. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 229–30 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 222. Id. at 228. 
 223. Id. 
1090 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLII 
to a particular type of criminal activity than others, members of the 
community all suffer from a gang’s criminal efforts to maintain its 
presence in the area.224  Before concluding, however, the BIA 
cautioned that its precedents are not blanket rejections of asylum 
claims involving gangs.225  Although children fleeing Honduras, El 
Salvador, and Guatemala have not been able to create a social group 
at the adjudicatory level, the circuit courts have not been unanimous 
in their rulings on the issue.226  The First and Fourth Circuits, like the 
vast majority of the circuit courts, have supported the BIA in denying 
asylum claims of children fleeing Central American gang violence.227 
2. The First and Fourth Circuits Agree and Deny Asylum 
The First Circuit addressed the issue of children fleeing Central 
American gang violence in Mendez-Barrera v. Holder.228  In Mendez-
Barrera, Yulma, a native of El Salvador, was approached by gang 
members who attempted to recruit her and threatened sexual abuse if 
                                                                                                                                         
 224. Id. at 250–51.  The BIA explained that gangs may target one segment of the 
population for recruitment, another for extortion, and yet others for kidnapping and 
drug trafficking.  Id. at 250. 
 225. Id. at 251. 
 226. Though most courts have expressed their views on the issue, there are some 
circuit courts that have avoided the issue by deferring to the BIA.  In Ucelo-Gomez 
v. Mukasey, the Second Circuit joined the majority of circuits in granting Chevron 
deference to the BIA. 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007).  However, the Second Circuit 
has quickly dismissed all appeals it received concerning children fleeing Central 
America because of gang recruitment tactics with a series of unpublished summary 
orders citing Ucelo-Gomez. See, e.g., Oliva-Flores v. Holder, 477 F. App’x 774, 775–
76 (2d Cir. 2012); Vasquez v. Holder, 343 F. App’x 681, 682–83 (2d Cir. 2009); 
Aguilar-Guerra v. Holder, 343 F. App’x 640, 641–42 (2d Cir. 2009); Lemus-Lemus v. 
Holder, 343 F. App’x 643, 644–45 (2d Cir. 2009).  The Ninth Circuit has used a similar 
strategy.  In Barrios v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit articulated that it would provide 
Chevron deference to the BIA with regard to its decision of whether individuals 
resisting gang recruitment constitute a particular social group. 581 F.3d 849, 854–55 
(9th Cir. 2009).  Once the court made clear that it would provide deference, it began 
to dismiss all asylum claims that had even a hint of the similar characteristics in a 
thick stream of memoranda. See, e.g., Andrade-Quiroz v. Holder, 444 F. App’x 122, 
123 (9th Cir. 2011); Orellana-Martinez v. Holder, 411 F. App’x 19, 20 (9th Cir. 2010); 
Mazariegos-Diaz v. Holder, 362 F. App’x 794, 795 (9th Cir. 2010); Garcia-Galvez v. 
Holder, 361 F. App’x 755, 756 (9th Cir. 2010); Cabrera-Rodriguez v. Holder, 351 F. 
App’x 204, 205 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 227. See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
 228. 602 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2010).  Though this case entails a female respondent, the 
First Circuit has used this case to deny asylum applications for men that are based on 
similar facts. See, e.g., Mayorga-Vidal v. Holder, 675 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 2012); Larios 
v. Holder, 608 F.3d 105, 109 (1st Cir. 2010).  Therefore, for purposes of the First 
Circuit, the same analysis applies to both males and females. See Mayorga-Vidal, 675 
F.3d at 15 (“[T]he same analysis applies . . . .”). 
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she refused.229  Gang members continued their harassment and 
attacked Yulma’s brother to pressure her to join.230  Then, gang 
members threw rocks at her house, which caused the roof to warp and 
buckle.231  Yulma no longer felt safe and fled to the United States 
through Mexico.232  The Department of Homeland Security initiated 
removal proceedings against her, where she applied for asylum.233  
Yulma argued that she was a refugee because she was a member of a 
particular social group, “young women recruited by gang members 
who resist such recruitment.”234  After appealing the immigration 
judge’s denial, the BIA held that group invalid because it did not 
meet the “particularity” and “social distinction” requirements.235 
On appeal, the First Circuit analyzed the validity of Yulma’s 
purported social group.236  The court focused on the “social 
distinction” requirement first and required Yulma to demonstrate 
that the group was recognized in the community as a cohesive 
group.237  The First Circuit found that none of the characteristics of 
her group rendered its members socially distinct in El Salvador.238  
Moving next to the “particularity” requirement, Yulma’s group was 
also found to be unsatisfactory.239  According to the First Circuit, it is 
impossible to identify who is or is not a young woman recruited by 
gang members who resists such recruitment.240  Of particular concern 
to the court was who would be considered young, what type of 
conduct constituted recruitment, and the degree to which an 
individual must resist such recruitment.241  The characteristics were 
held to be ambiguous and subjective, which was fatal to Yulma’s 
claim.242  For these reasons, the First Circuit upheld the BIA’s 
ruling.243 
                                                                                                                                         
 229. Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 23 (1st Cir. 2010). 
 230. Id. at 23–24. 
 231. Id. at 24. 
 232. Id. at 23–24. 
 233. Id. at 23. 
 234. Id. at 24. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 26–27. 
 237. Id. at 26. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. at 27. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 28. 
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The Fourth Circuit agrees with the First Circuit in believing that 
the “particularity” requirement is not satisfied for these types of 
purported social groups.244  In Solomon-Membreno v. Holder, Jorge 
and his sister Fatima, the brave children discussed in the Introduction 
to this Note, left El Salvador because of constant fear of harassment, 
alleged rape, and beatings inflicted by MS-13.245  In removal 
proceedings, Jorge argued that he belonged to the social 
group, “young Salvadoran students who expressly 
oppose gang practices and values and wish to protect their families 
against such practices.”246  In determining the outcome of the case, the 
Fourth Circuit focused on the “particularity” requirement.247  In 
affirming the BIA’s denial of asylum, the court explained that the 
proposed social group lacked particularity because it did not provide 
a means to determine what actions were sufficient to oppose MS-13.248  
Filing a police report, expressing anti-gang sentiment through the 
media, and participating in city-wide anti-gang protests could all be 
considered opposing gang practices, the court reasoned, but do not 
provide an adequate benchmark for determining group 
membership.249  The vast majority of circuit courts have engaged in 
similar analyses and subsequently denied asylum to these children.250  
                                                                                                                                         
 244. Solomon-Membreno v. Holder, 578 F. App’x 300, 306 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 245. Id. at 302. 
 246. Id. at 304. 
 247. Id. at 304.  The Fourth Circuit seems to use the particularity prong as its main 
method of striking the asylum claims based on these facts. See, e.g., Zelaya v. Holder, 
668 F.3d 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2012).  The court analogized opposing gangs to refusing to 
join a gang, and subsequently held that the characteristic is too amorphous for the 
same reasons. See id. 
 248. Solomon-Membreno, 578 F. App’x at 306. 
 249. Id. at 306. 
 250. See, e.g., De Leon-Saj v. Holder, 583 F. App’x 429, 430 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(holding that such groups are overly-broad and do not distinguish between members 
and non-members); Umaña-Ramos v. Holder, 724 F.3d 667, 673–74 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(finding such groups do not meet the particularity and social distinction 
requirements); Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 521–22 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(holding that such groups lack particularity and social distinction); Gaitan v. Holder, 
671 F.3d 678, 682 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding that the asylum-seeker is not socially 
distinct from any other Salvadoran that experiences gang violence); Ortiz-Puentes v. 
Holder, 662 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that a group defined as 
Guatemalans who refused to join a gang and were persecuted as a result does not 
meet the particularity and social distinction requirement); Turcios-Avila v. U.S. 
Attorney Gen., 362 F. App’x 37, 42 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding that young Honduran 
men who refuse to join gangs do not even pass the immutable characteristic analysis); 
Gomez-Benitez v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 295 F. App’x 324, 326 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that “Honduran schoolboys who conscientiously refuse to join gangs” are 
not a socially distinct group and do not satisfy particularity because recognition of it 
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However, there are two circuit courts in like positions that have yet to 
express their opinions on the matter.251 
3. The Third and Seventh Circuits Have Not Addressed the Issue 
Unlike the First and Fourth Circuits, the Third and Seventh 
Circuits have not been decisive on the issue of children fleeing 
Central American gang violence.  After rejecting the BIA’s three-step 
test in Valdiviezo-Galdamez,252 the Third Circuit was faced with a 
similar social group.  In Mejia-Fuentes v. Attorney General of the 
United States,253 Jose Osmin Mejia–Fuentes, a Salvadoran native, 
claimed that he had been persecuted by members of MS-13 and that 
he feared future persecution if he returned to El Salvador.254  The 
respondent explained that he was persecuted by the gang because he 
refused to join after they attempted to recruit him.255  Mejia-Fuentes 
applied for asylum and attempted to establish refugee status as a 
member of the particular social group, “young men who morally 
oppose gangs and lack family ties.”256  The BIA held that Mejia-
Fuentes failed to demonstrate that his proposed social group had the 
necessary social distinction to be recognized as a particular social 
group.257  The Third Circuit began its analysis by reaffirming its 
holding in Valdiviezo-Galdamez, that social distinction and 
particularity were not entitled to Chevron deference.258 
The court then approached whether Jose’s social group existed 
prior to persecution.259  However, instead of taking the opportunity to 
explicitly and definitively rule on the matter post-Valdiviezo-
                                                                                                                                         
would permit the particular social group category to be a “catch-all” for Honduran 
immigrants). 
 251. See discussion infra Part II.B.3. 
 252. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
 253. 463 F. App’x 76 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 254. Id. at 77. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. at 77–78. 
 257. Id. at 79. 
 258. Id. at 79–80 (citing Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 
582 (3d Cir. 2011)). 
 259. Id. at 80.  In the Third Circuit’s jurisprudence, an asylum applicant who seeks 
to establish refugee status via membership in a particular social group must 
demonstrate that the social group existed prior to the persecution. See Lukwago v. 
Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 172 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he ‘particular social group’ must have 
existed before the persecution began.”).  The purpose of this test is to show that the 
social group exists independently of the persecution suffered by the applicant. See id. 
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Galdamez II, the court quoted a footnote in Valdiviezo-Galdamez I, 
which stated: 
Before the [immigration judge], Galdamez identified the particular 
social group to which he belongs as “those who have been actively 
recruited by gangs but have refused to join because they oppose 
these gangs.”  In his brief, he identifies the group as “young 
Honduran men who have been actively recruited by gangs and who 
have been persecuted by these gangs for their refusal to accept 
membership.”  In discussing the group, we omit the fact of the 
group’s later persecution from its definition to make clear that the 
group exists independently of its persecution.260 
The Third Circuit then remanded the case to the BIA to decide if 
“young men who morally oppose gangs and lack family ties,” 
constitutes a particular social group under the INA, and in 
accordance with In re Acosta.261  By remanding without determining 
whether Jose’s group constituted a particular social group, the court 
avoided this issue.  However, the Third Circuit is not the only court 
that has yet to definitively weigh in on the controversy. 
The Seventh Circuit also has yet to give its opinion on the issue of 
whether children fleeing gang violence are entitled to asylum.  There 
are only three cases in its jurisprudence that touch upon the issue.262 
The court was faced with individuals seeking asylum in the United 
States because of a gang’s criminal activity in Cece v. Holder263 and 
Benitez Ramos v. Holder,264 but neither case dealt with forced 
recruitment.  In Benetiz Ramos, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its 
rejection of the “social distinction” requirement and vacated the 
BIA’s denial of withholding removal to a former gang member who 
feared persecution if he returned to El Salvador.265  In Cece, the court 
                                                                                                                                         
 260. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 502 F.3d 285, 290 n.3 (3d Cir. 
2007) (citation omitted). 
 261. Meja-Fuentes, 463 F. App’x at 80–81. 
 262. See Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2013); Bueso-Avila v. Holder, 663 
F.3d 934, 935 (7th Cir. 2011); Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426 (7th Cir. 2009).  
Though Bueso-Avila involves a fifteen-year-old child fleeing gang violence, the case 
addresses the sufficiency of evidence, which is outside the scope of this Note. See 
Bueso-Avila, 663 F.3d at 938 (“The issue before us, then, is whether the evidentiary 
record ‘compels the conclusion’ that the gang targeted Bueso–Avila, at least in part, 
because of his religion or church group membership.”). 
 263. 733 F.3d 662. 
 264. 589 F.3d 426. 
 265. Id. at 431–32 (“Ramos was a member of a specific, well-recognized, indeed 
notorious gang, the former members of which do not constitute a ‘category . . . far too 
unspecific and amorphous to be called a social group.’ It is neither unspecific nor 
amorphous.”). 
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held that the asylum-seeker, Cece, established that she belonged to a 
cognizable social group, namely “young women who are targeted for 
prostitution by traffickers in Albania.”266  The traffickers mentioned 
in the definition were a local gang who forced women into 
prostitution rings.267  Critical to its holding, the Seventh Circuit stated 
that because age, gender, nationality, and living situation are 
unalterable, those characteristics qualify the proposed group as a 
protectable group under asylum law.268  The questions for the near 
future are: will the Third Circuit take up the issue with a post-
Valdiviezo-Galdamez analysis, and how will the Seventh Circuit rule 
on the matter when given the opportunity? 
4. The Tenth Circuit Finds Only “Particularity” 
In Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, the Tenth Circuit became the first 
circuit court to hold that a group made up of individuals who resist 
gang recruitment satisfies the BIA’s “particularity” requirement.269 
Rivera-Barrientos concerned Carmen, a Salvadoran native, who was 
approached by MS-13 gang members in her neighborhood in an 
attempt to recruit her.270  Carmen refused to join them because she 
did not approve of the gang’s activities, to which the gang members 
responded by threatening her family.271  The gang continued to harass 
Carmen and pressure her to join the gang, but she stayed true to her 
convictions.272  One day, on her walk to the bus station, Carmen 
encountered five gang members who began to demand, yet again, that 
she join their gang.273  Upon refusing, a gang member put a knife to 
Carmen’s throat, forced her into a car, and blindfolded her.274  After 
driving to a field, the gang members dragged Carmen out of the car 
and asked if she had changed her mind.275  When she answered in the 
negative, the gang members began kissing her, and when she tried to 
escape, one of them struck her in the face with a bottle.276  Three of 
the gang members then proceeded to rape her.277  When they finished, 
                                                                                                                                         
 266. Cece, 733 F.3d at 677. 
 267. Id. at 666. 
 268. Id. at 673. 
 269. 666 F.3d 641, 650 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 270. Id. at 644. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. 
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the gang member threatened to kill her and her mother if she told the 
police, and Carmen complied for fear of retaliation and because she 
did not believe the police would help.278  After the incident, Carmen 
did not leave her house for several days, but the gang began showing 
up at her house to continue their pursuit of recruiting her.279  With her 
mother continuously lying to the gang about her whereabouts, 
Carmen fled El Salvador for the United States, where immigration 
officials apprehended her.280 
In removal proceedings, Carmen applied for asylum and argued 
that she was a refugee because she belonged to a particular social 
group.281  The immigration judge held that Carmen had failed to 
establish persecution on account of her group,282 “women in El 
Salvador between the ages of 12 and 25 who resisted gang 
recruitment.”283  On appeal, the BIA denied her claim for asylum, 
finding that young women who refuse to join gangs do not make up a 
group that is sufficiently particular or socially distinct.284  Carmen then 
took her claim to the Tenth Circuit to determine if her group could in 
fact constitute a cognizable social group. 
The Tenth Circuit analyzed Carmen’s purported group through the 
BIA’s “particularity” and “social distinction” requirements.285  
Despite affording the BIA Chevron deference on the issue, the court 
nevertheless held that “women in El Salvador between the ages of 12 
and 25 who resisted gang recruitment” was in fact a particularly 
defined group.286  The court conceded that the definition as a whole 
may be broad and with ambiguous terms, but its individual traits were 
not vague:287  “a discrete class of young persons sharing the past 
experience of having resisted gang recruitment can be a particularly 
defined trait.”288  The court then asserted that characteristics such as 
age and gender are easily defined and are unlike terms such as being 
middle class or being part of a stable family.289  The Tenth Circuit 
concluded its “particularity” analysis by explicitly disagreeing with 
                                                                                                                                         
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. at 644–45. 
 282. Id. at 645. 
 283. Id. at 647. 
 284. Id. at 648. 
 285. Id. at 648–54. 
 286. Id. at 650. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. 
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the BIA’s determination that Carmen’s social group was not 
particularly defined.290 
The court, however, denied Carmen’s claim because it determined 
that her proposed group lacked the requisite social distinction.291  The 
Tenth Circuit found that MS-13 directs harm to any individual to 
promote its interest.292  Therefore, the court stated, individuals who 
resist recruitment efforts are in no different of a situation than other 
members of the community who interfere with the gang’s interests.293  
Thus, the court affirmed the BIA’s determination that young women 
who resist gang recruitment efforts do not meet the “social 
distinction” requirement.294  The Tenth Circuit, consequently, agrees 
with its sister courts in holding that these types of social groups are 
not “socially distinct,” but clearly believes they satisfy the 
“particularity” requirement.295 
5. Summary of Issues for Analysis 
In sum, the BIA has added two new requirements, “particularity” 
and “social distinction,” to its asylum analysis.296  However, there has 
been significant disagreement between circuits as to the appropriate 
level of deference these new qualifications should receive.297  While 
the majority of circuit courts have given the BIA Chevron deference 
in articulating the new conditions, the Ninth Circuit applied an 
alternative test, the Seventh Circuit explicitly rejected the social 
distinction requirement, and the Third Circuit refused to apply 
both.298  In the context of children fleeing Central America because of 
gang-forced recruitment, the BIA has consistently held that such 
groups do not constitute a “particular social group” for asylum 
purposes.299  The vast majority of circuits have agreed with the BIA by 
ruling explicitly on the matter and rejecting such asylum claims,300 or 
                                                                                                                                         
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. at 654. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id.  Importantly, the Tenth Circuit had the opportunity to take on the issue 
with regard to men but elected to avoid the issue by denying an asylum claim on 
different grounds. See Cisneros-Diaz v. Holder, 415 F. App’x 940, 943 (10th Cir. 
2011). 
 295. Rivera-Barrientos, 666 F.3d at 650. 
 296. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 297. See supra Part II.A.4. 
 298. See supra Part II.A.4. 
 299. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 300. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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by simply granting Chevron deference to the BIA.301  However, the 
Third and Seventh Circuits have yet to rule on the matter, and the 
Tenth Circuit held that young women who resist gang recruitment is 
sufficiently defined with particularity.302 
III.  THE BIA IS ENTITLED TO DEFERENCE AND CHILD VICTIMS 
OF GANG VIOLENCE ARE ENTITLED TO ASYLUM 
The main issue with asylum law as it stands today with respect to 
membership in a particular social group is that the courts of appeals 
have not all agreed on the appropriate deference level or how it 
applies to children fleeing Central American gang activity.  These 
disparate views, or lack thereof, should align so as to avoid 
contradictory results based on geography, given that asylum and 
immigration law is a national issue.  The first step is to apply a 
uniform level of deference to the BIA’s three-step test.  The circuit 
courts should also take the opportunity to give their opinions on the 
issue of asylum applicants who are young and resist gang recruitment 
in their home country.  In doing so, the courts of appeals should 
accept the social group definition, “males between the ages of 11-18 
who refuse gang membership and resist gang-forced recruitment,” as 
one that can be generally applied to the humanitarian crisis in Central 
America and passes the BIA three-step test. 
A. The BIA Should Be Afforded Chevron Deference 
The circuit courts apply varying levels of deference to the BIA’s 
three-step test,303 but this should not be the case.  The Department of 
Justice has explicitly imposed an obligation on the BIA to provide 
clear and uniform guidance to the general public.304  Ever since the 
BIA created its three-step test and took a stance on the issue of young 
male children resisting gangs, subsequent asylum jurisprudence has 
been anything but clear and uniform.305  Circuit courts should grant 
the BIA Chevron deference to minimize confusion.  When courts of 
                                                                                                                                         
 301. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 302. See supra Parts II.B.4–5. 
 303. See discussion supra Part II.A.4. 
 304. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1) (2014). 
 305. See supra Part II.A.  Not only have circuits explicitly stated their confusion 
with the BIA’s requirements and how they apply to the issue at hand, but they go so 
far as to reject the requirements or impose their own tests. See discussion supra Part 
II.A. 
2015] ASYLUM FOR THE DEFENSELESS 1099 
appeals refuse to give Chevron deference to an agency, there is a 
danger that it will further promote inconsistency.306 
The division amongst courts of appeals as to the appropriate 
deference level that should be granted to the BIA in this situation can 
be resolved by analyzing the BIA’s precedents and fundamental 
agency deference jurisprudence.  This analysis first necessitates an 
inquiry into whether the BIA deserves deference under United States 
v. Mead. 307  Under Mead, an agency qualifies for Chevron deference 
when Congress has delegated authority to the agency to make rules 
carrying the force of law, and the agency promulgates rules in the 
exercise of that authority.308  Congress delegated rulemaking authority 
to the Attorney General,309 who subsequently empowered the BIA 
with the same authority.310  Additionally, the BIA created its three-
step test in the exercise of that authority via case-by-case 
adjudication.311  Thus, the BIA may be entitled to Chevron deference 
in its interpretations of the INA and in its later addition of 
requirements.312 
The issue of whether Chevron deference is, in fact, appropriate in 
light of the BIA’s precedents highlights the split where some circuit 
courts abandon the BIA three-step test and others embrace it.313  The 
BIA announced its first prong, the “common and immutable 
characteristic” requirement, in In re Acosta.314  The Supreme Court 
determined the proper deference level for this first requirement, 
holding that the BIA was entitled to Chevron deference.315  The BIA, 
however, faced criticism when it created two new qualifications for 
establishing a “particular social group.”316 
The “social distinction” requirement was challenged by two courts 
of appeals for its allegedly inconsistent use and nonsensical 
                                                                                                                                         
 306. See supra Part II. 
 307. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 308. Id. at 226–27. 
 309. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2012); see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 
423 (1987). 
 310. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999).  Indeed, no circuit court 
disagrees with this position. 
 311. See discussion supra Part II.A; see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. 
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981–82 (2005). 
 312. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27. 
 313. See supra Part II.A.4. 
 314. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 315. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 316. See supra Part II.A.4. 
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application.317  The theory that the BIA has applied the “social 
distinction” requirement inconsistently may have some merit.  It is 
true that the BIA has held that certain groups constitute “particular 
social groups” without mentioning whether they were socially 
distinct.318  This argument loses strength, however, when one 
recognizes that those cases were all decided before the BIA 
announced the “social distinction” requirement.319  Consequently, this 
argument fails because it relies on a word search of the term “social 
distinction” rather than the BIA’s use of the requirement in its 
analysis of asylum cases.320 
The other argument for the BIA’s inconsistency in applying the 
“social distinction” requirement alleges that the requirement adds 
another test to the legal analysis without explaining the reason for the 
new rule.321  This argument stems from a misunderstanding of how the 
BIA scrutinizes asylum claims.  The BIA’s “social distinction” prong 
was always a part of its analysis, albeit not formally named.322  
Assuming that the anti-“social distinction” position is correct, the 
BIA may nevertheless be entitled to Chevron deference.323  On 
numerous occasions, the BIA has extensively explained its reasoning 
behind social distinction.324  Thus, even if it is an inconsistency, it 
cannot, by any measure, be an unexplained inconsistency.325  Further, 
the BIA is not required to stick with its initial formulation,326 if some 
day it decides to stop applying its three-part test.  Importantly, the 
                                                                                                                                         
 317. See supra Part II.A.4. 
 318. See, e.g., In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (B.I.A. 1996); In re Toboso-
Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822 (B.I.A. 1990); In re Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658, 
662 (B.I.A. 1988). 
 319. See In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959 (B.I.A. 2006) (explaining it previously 
used societal recognition in its analysis, and it was merely announcing it as a social 
distinction test). 
 320. See id. 
 321. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 604 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
 322. See, e.g., In re H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 342–43 (B.I.A. 1996) (applying a 
“distinction” and “recognition” analysis to the groups previously asserted). 
 323. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
981 (2005) (“Agency inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the agency’s 
interpretation under the Chevron framework.  Unexplained inconsistency is, at most, 
a reason for holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from 
agency practice under the Administrative Procedure Act.”). 
 324. See, e.g., In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 213–21 (B.I.A. 2014); In re M-E-
V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237–49 (B.I.A. 2014); In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 
582–588 (B.I.A. 2008). 
 325. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, 545 U.S. at 981. 
 326. See id. 
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same analysis can be applied to the arguments alleging the 
“particularity” requirement was inconsistently used. 
Next, opposing circuit courts attempt to argue that the use of the 
“social distinction” requirement is unreasonable, and, therefore, not 
entitled to Chevron deference.327  The thrust of this argument lies in 
the view that to require social distinction would put individuals 
fleeing persecution in harm’s way,328 and in the theory that some 
characteristics are inherently invisible and, in fact, are purposely 
concealed.329  The latter rationale misunderstands what the BIA 
attempts to make clear.  Social distinction does not require “ocular” 
visibility.330  Social distinction merely requires that the members of the 
community be able to distinguish the group from the rest of society, 
or, simply put, recognize the group’s existence.331  The former 
rationale also fails because it, too, misinterprets the “social 
distinction” requirement.  An individual need not state his or her 
characteristic to the public at large.  So long as the public can perceive 
or recognize a group, society need not identify an individual member 
of that group.332  Therefore, the BIA should be entitled to Chevron 
deference by all circuit courts333 for its two new qualifications, which 
would allow for greater uniformity. 
B. The Third and Seventh Circuits Should Grant Asylum 
As discussed in Part II, the Third and Seventh Circuits have either 
avoided the issue of children fleeing Central America because of gang 
violence or have not had the opportunity to rule on the matter.334  
These Circuits should take the next opportunity to definitively rule on 
the matter to either promote uniformity among the circuit courts or to 
force the Supreme Court of the United States to rule by highlighting a 
split.  However, in considering whether young individuals who resist 
                                                                                                                                         
 327. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 607 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
 328. Id. 
 329. See Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009).  This approach argues, 
for example, that homosexual individuals would not be recognized or distinguished 
from heterosexual individuals. Id. 
 330. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 240 (B.I.A. 2014) (emphasizing the 
importance of “perception” or “recognition”). 
 331. Id. (renaming social visibility to social distinction to emphasize that the term 
social visibility was never literally interpreted). 
 332. Id.  The BIA explained that members of a community may not be able to 
identify individual homosexuals, but society could still perceive homosexuals as a 
particular social group because of sociopolitical or cultural conditions. Id. 
 333. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999). 
 334. See discussion supra Part II.B.3. 
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gang recruitment constitutes a “particular social group” under the 
INA, these courts should review the issue de novo because the BIA 
has already evaluated the issue.335  While giving deference to the BIA 
for its three-step test, the circuit courts would be able to review the 
issue of Central American children seeking asylum anew.336  
Moreover, the Third and Seventh Circuits may disagree with their 
sister courts and recognize that young males or females337 who refuse 
to join gangs, despite being subjected to forced recruitment, 
constitutes a particular social group that passes the BIA’s three-step 
test.338 
The specific definition that courts should accept when evaluating 
asylum claims from children fleeing gang violence in Central America 
is “males between the ages of 11-18 who refuse gang membership and 
resist gang-forced recruitment.”339  This definition would allow the 
courts of appeals that accord Chevron deference to the BIA to find a 
cognizable group while working within the three-prong test.  Each 
characteristic of the proposed group meets the three requirements: a 
common, immutable characteristic, “particularity,” and “social 
distinction.”340 
1. Gender, Age, and Resistance to Recruitment Are Common, 
Immutable Characteristics 
Gender is undoubtedly an immutable characteristic that is common 
among the members of the proposed group.  If the entire group is 
composed of men, or male children, they must necessarily share the 
trait of maleness.  Furthermore, any individual in the proposed group 
is unlikely to unilaterally be able to change the fact that he is male.341  
Moreover, the BIA and courts of appeals have accepted gender as an 
                                                                                                                                         
 335. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 336. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 337. A similar analysis may apply to either gender.  Though, as mentioned supra 
note 31, female children raise another issue not covered by this topic because of its 
complexity, namely sexual violence. 
 338. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 232 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 339. The logic behind the age range is derived from the fact that gangs are known 
to prey on younger individuals. See UNHCR, supra note 34, at 4.  Recall that this 
Note speaks in terms of male children because of the complex legal issues that female 
children must navigate when subjected to sexual violence, but it is possible that a 
similar analysis may apply to females. See supra note 31. 
 340. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 237. 
 341. See In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (B.I.A. 1996) (holding that the 
characteristic of being a young woman cannot be changed). 
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immutable characteristic.342  Indeed, even the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees stated that gender is “an innate and 
immutable characteristic.”343  Further, the Seventh Circuit has already 
accepted gender as an unchangeable characteristic344 and need only 
apply it to the proposed definition. 
Age is also an immutable characteristic that would be common 
among the group’s members.  Undeniably, an individual cannot 
change his or her age and every member of the group, who must 
therefore be within the age range, shares a common trait.345  An 
asylum applicant would not be able to make him or herself fit into the 
group.  To do so would require an individual to make him or herself 
younger or older at will.  Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has conceded 
that age qualifies as a common, immutable characteristic.346 
Refusing to join a gang and resisting subsequent forced recruitment 
can be an immutable and common characteristic if categorized as a 
shared past experience amongst the group.347  This is particularly true 
because the past experience of declining a membership offer and 
resisting the inevitable forced recruitment would not change, given 
the fact that it has already occurred.348  Taking active steps in 
opposition to a gang would be a common characteristic among the 
members of the group.349  The Seventh Circuit has held that a 
characteristic may be immutable because it has imparted a label that 
                                                                                                                                         
 342. See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (“The shared 
characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some 
circumstances it might be a shared past experience such as former military leadership 
or land ownership.”).  Circuit courts have also acknowledged such a finding. See, e.g., 
Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 797 (9th Cir. 2005); Niang v. Gonzales, 422 
F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 343. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, GUIDELINES ON 
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION: GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION WITHIN THE 
CONTEXT OF ARTICLE 1A(2) OF THE 1951 CONVENTION AND/OR ITS 1967 PROTOCOL 
RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 8 (2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/
eoir/vll/benchbook/resources/UNHCR_Guidelines_Gender.pdf. 
 344. See Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 672 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 345. Id. at 673 (stating that age is not alterable). 
 346. Id. 
 347. See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.  In In re S-E-G-, the BIA found that 
“youth who have been targeted for recruitment by, and resisted, criminal gangs may 
have a shared past experience, which, by definition, cannot be changed. However, 
this does not necessarily mean that the shared past experience suffices to define a 
particular social group for asylum purposes.” 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584 (B.I.A. 2008). 
 348. See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.  It is fundamental to their conscience 
because these teenagers are making the conscientious effort to refuse joining a 
criminal organization.  They are keeping to their morals and values by taking the 
more difficult road. 
 349. See Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1077, 1082 n.3 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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cannot be undone,350 and that is exactly what is done when an 
individual refuses to join a gang.  The children that resist a gang’s 
recruitment efforts are constantly hunted, and they are often unsafe 
even in their own homes.351  As the Tenth Circuit explained in Rivera-
Barrientos, after Carmen had a knife placed against her throat, was 
hit with a bottle in the face, and endured a gang rape, the gang 
members appeared at her home to continue their harsh recruitment 
tactics.352  It seems clear that she was labeled as a person who refused 
to join their ranks and was targeted for that purpose.353  The people 
who receive this label are all treated the same: with hostility.354  The 
only way to undo this label would be to join the gang, which is the 
very thing they are refusing to do.355  Therefore, this group definition 
satisfies the common, immutable characteristic requirement. 
2. Gender, Age, and Refusal to Join a Gang Define the Group with 
Particularity 
The “male” trait also satisfies the BIA’s “particularity” 
requirement.  The “particularity” requirement mandates the 
existence of a definitive benchmark to indicate who falls within the 
purported group.356   There must be definable boundaries, and they 
cannot be subjective.357  A gender characteristic, such as maleness, 
serves as a definitive benchmark because358 it would be easy to 
recognize who falls into the group by virtue of their gender identity.359  
Information on which gender an individual considers him or herself 
can be quickly obtained by reading legitimate government documents 
that require a person to identify which gender he or she belongs to.  
For example, a New York citizen’s gender can be known by looking 
                                                                                                                                         
 350. See Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 670 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 351. See, e.g., Solomon-Membreno v. Holder, 578 F. App’x 300, 302 (4th Cir. 2014) 
(the house was set on fire); Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 2010) 
(gang members threw rocks at the house). 
 352. See Part II.B.4. 
 353. See Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641, 646 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting 
the BIA’s determination that the gang members attempted to force her to join the 
gang and she was attacked due to her refusal). 
 354. See UNHCR, supra note 34. 
 355. See Cece, 733 F.3d at 669.  In Cece, the Seventh Circuit held that a woman 
should not be required to find a man to protect her. Id.  The choice to be single was 
found to be the type of fundamental characteristic that courts do not ask asylum 
applicants to change. See Id. 
 356. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 239 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 357. Id. 
 358. See In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 393 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 359. See generally Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641, 650 (10th Cir. 2012). 
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at his or her driver’s license or non-driver identification card, which 
requires the owner of the license or card to mark which gender he or 
she belongs to when filling out the application.360  Therefore, the 
Third and Seventh Circuits should adopt the portion of Rivera-
Barrientos that acknowledges gender as a characteristic that is 
susceptible to easy definition, and thus, particularly defined.361 
Likewise, the age range feature of the proposed definition should 
also meet the “particularity” hurdle.362  Proving that an individual is 
within the requisite age range would simply require a showing of a 
birth certificate.363  If the asylum-seeker is below or above the age 
range, then he or she will not be a member of the group.  Age, like 
gender, is susceptible to easy definition and therefore satisfies the 
“particularity” requirement.364 
The last characteristic of the proposed definition, refusing to join a 
gang and resisting forced recruitment, is also particularly defined.  A 
showing of “particularity” in this instance would require a showing 
that, at some point, the asylum-seeker was asked to join the gang, but 
he refused.  Additionally, an asylum applicant would have to show 
that the gang used forced recruitment as a tactic to coerce 
compliance, but he stayed true to his conviction.365  Notably, the 
proposed definition replaces “resistance to gang recruitment,” with 
“refusal to join a gang and resist forced recruitment.”  This is because 
of the subjectivity of the former phrasing.  Resistance to gang 
recruitment was not widely accepted because it is very subjective.366  
The largest criticism of resistance to gang recruitment received from 
courts is the problem in determining when an individual has resisted 
enough to become a member of the group.367  Moreover, it leaves 
open the question of what exactly constitutes resistance to gang 
recruitment.368 
                                                                                                                                         
 360. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, APPLICATION FOR DIVER LICENSE 
OR NON-DRIVER ID CARD, available at http://dmv.ny.gov/forms/mv44.pdf. 
 361. See Rivera-Barrientos, 666 F.3d at 650. 
 362. See In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (B.I.A. 1996)  (“young women”). 
 363. Admittedly, a child under the age of eighteen in a foreign country may have 
difficulty gaining access to a birth certificate from their home country. 
 364. See Rivera-Barrientos, 666 F.3d at 650. 
 365. See supra Part II.B.4. 
 366. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 367. See supra Part II.B.2; see also Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 27 (1st 
Cir. 2010) (explaining its concern of knowing the requisite degree to which an 
individual must resist such recruitment). 
 368. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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“Refusal to join a gang and resisting forced recruitment,” however, 
overcomes the criticism that the characteristic “resistance to gang 
recruitment” faced.  Imposing a refusal characteristic requires an 
individual to demonstrate that he was approached for the purpose of 
recruitment and that he made known his opposition to gang activity.  
This is a very objective standard because there is undoubtedly no 
interpretive question about the word “no.”  Resisting forced 
recruitment is also an objective term because it narrows the type of 
persecution that is suffered.  Resistance plainly means “the inherent 
ability of an organism to resist harmful influences.”369  Thus, the 
asylum-seeker would have to continue refusing to join a gang despite 
the use of forced recruitment.370  Like the rest of the group, forced 
recruitment is not an amorphous term.  As explained above in Part I, 
gangs will carry out their threats of physical harm, rape, and death to 
both the asylum applicants and their family members.  Therefore, 
refusal to join a gang and resisting forced recruitment is particularly 
defined because an immigration judge could easily identify if an 
asylum-applicant answered the gangs in the negative and whether the 
asylum-applicant has persisted in his or her refusal despite being 
subjected to forced recruitment. 
3. Gender, Age, and Refusal to Join a Gang Socially Distinguish 
Members of the Group 
Finally, “males between the ages of 11–18 who refuse gang 
membership and resist gang-forced recruitment” should be 
considered socially distinct within their society.   In 2003, the 
Salvadoran, Honduran, and Guatemalan legislatures enacted anti-
gang laws in response to popular demand to deal with the crippling 
effect the gangs were having on the community.371  These laws were 
used to incarcerate large numbers of youth who had tattoos.372  The 
Honduran government passed legislation making gang membership 
illegal.373  Furthermore, there are credible reports from the 
Congressional Research Service374 of civilian vigilante killings of gang 
                                                                                                                                         
 369. MIRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 708 (2014) 
 370. See Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641 (10th Cir. 2012) (continuing her 
refusal to join the gang despite being threatened with a knife at her throat). 
 371. CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34112, GANGS IN 
CENTRAL AMERICA 9 (2014), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
RL34112.pdf. 
 372. Id. 
 373. Id. 
 374. The Congressional Research Service is a legislative branch agency that 
provides policy and legal analysis to committees and both members of the House and 
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members.375  This demonstrates how society, both the countries’ 
citizens and their elected officials, distinguish between youth gang 
members and youth non-members.  The fact that law enforcement 
specifically targeted youth gang members shows that Central 
American society distinguishes between those who have been 
recruited and those who have not. 
In addition, though the persecutor’s perception of the purported 
social group is not determinative, it is probative into the inquiry of 
social distinction.376  Gang members recognize adolescent children as 
a group and target them specifically for recruitment.377  As 
demonstrated supra in Part II, upon refusal, the same children are 
then persecuted for continuing to resist the forced recruitment.  It 
seems logical that if the recruited children joined the gang, they 
would no longer be persecuted for the purpose of recruitment. 
Further proof of societal recognition is the recent influx of 
unaccompanied minors.378  The very fact that unaccompanied minors 
are pouring into the United States is evidence that mothers and 
fathers recognize that these children are being subject to 
extraordinary levels of gang violence.379  The attempt to send their 
children out of the country alone demonstrates that society 
distinguishes the children from society as a whole with regard to the 
susceptibility to gang-forced recruitment.  Moreover, as the BIA has 
stated, the Salvadoran, Honduran, and Guatemalan community does 
not have to identify which child is a specific gender, age, and has 
                                                                                                                                         
Senate.  Congressional Research Service Careers, LIBR. CONGRESS, http://www.loc.
gov/crsinfo/ (last visited May 15, 2015). 
 375. See SEELKE, supra note 371. 
 376. See In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 218 (B.I.A. 2014) (“The perception of 
the applicant’s persecutors may be relevant because it can be indicative of whether 
society views the group as distinct.  But the persecutors’ perception is not itself 
enough to make a group socially distinct.”). 
 377. See UNHCR, supra note 34, at 4. 
 378. See Robles, supra note 50.  President Barack Obama has named this exodus 
of children from Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador an “urgent humanitarian 
situation.” Jens Manuel Krogstad & Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, Number of Latino 
Children Caught Trying to Enter U.S. Nearly Doubles in Less than a Year, PEW RES. 
CENTER (June 10, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/10/number-
of-latino-children-caught-trying-to-enter-u-s-nearly-doubles-in-less-than-a-year/.  
From 2009 to 2014, there has been over a 700% increase in apprehensions of 
unaccompanied minors traveling into the United States from El Salvador. Id.  The 
numbers for Guatemalan unaccompanied minor children have increased by over 
900%. Id.  Honduras has seen a far more shocking increase as the numbers have 
grown from 968 in 2009 to 13,282 in 2014, a 1272% increase. Id. 
 379. See Robles, supra note 50 (“The first thing we can think of is to send our 
children to the United States.”). 
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refused gang recruitment and subsequently resisted forced 
recruitment.380  Society need only recognize that such a group exists.381  
Society, therefore, does distinguish “males between the ages of 11–18 
who refuse gang membership and resist gang-forced recruitment.”  
Thus, the Third and Seventh Circuit, in applying Chevron deference 
to the BIA’s three-pronged test, should recognize “males between the 
ages of 11–18 who refuse gang membership and resist gang-forced 
recruitment” as a particular social group for asylum purposes. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the BIA’s consistent use of a three-step test, circuit courts 
have not unanimously accepted it.382  The Supreme Court’s failure to 
weigh in on the issue of gang related asylum applications has left the 
circuit court jurisprudence in disarray.383  In their confusion, courts of 
appeals have either rejected the entire test, opposed part of the test, 
or put forth their own alternative.384  By giving the BIA proper 
deference and applying the purported definition for male children, 
circuit courts will, in time, create a path to uniformity in asylum law.  
In doing so, courts should review the BIA’s decision de novo, and 
decide for themselves whether children fleeing Central America 
because of widespread and uncontrollable gang violence are entitled 
to asylum. 
Hopefully, the Third and Seventh Circuits will soon get the chance 
to finally add their opinion into this complex national issue.  When 
the opportunity arises, the Third and Seventh Circuits should 
recognize the valid claims that many of these children bring into 
immigration court.  The horrific conditions in inner cities in Central 
America is the type of issue that refugees were meant to be protected 
from under the INA.  Children who are targeted because of their 
gender and age should be protected from gang-forced recruitment 
when they leave their home country because death or injury is almost 
inevitable.  In using the BIA’s three-part test, the Third and Seventh 
Circuits will be able to resolve the current issue of children from 
Central America seeking asylum en masse. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
 380. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 240 (B.I.A. 2014) (“Society can 
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 382. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
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